Barox Kommunikation GmbH produces network switches specialized for video streaming applications like CCTV. The firmware on the switch models RY-LGSP23-10G and RY-GSP22-26/370 contains vulnerabilities where an attacker can retrieve the passwords of other local users on the device in plaintext.
Exposure of Sensitive Information (CWE-200) and Insecure Password Storage (CWE-257) in the web-based management interface of barox switches running firmware below 6.54.3960 (RY-LGSP23-10G) or below 1.03.1740 (RY-GSP22-26/370) allows authenticated administrative users to retrieve the plaintext passwords of all other local users via the Management API.
The vulnerability enables any attacker with admin access to dump credentials of all accounts stored on the device, which can then be reused for lateral movement or further compromise. This is possible via the password reset form. When this form is opened, an API request GET /user_config?user= is triggered, and the response is used in the front end to populate the username field. The contents of the password field are visually masked in the front end. However, the response to the API request directly contains the user’s password in plain text, which can easily be read from the network log using just the browser’s developer tools.
Since passwords are stored or processed in a recoverable format, this represents a critical failure in secure credential handling. The issue has been fixed in firmware versions 6.54.3960 and 1.03.1740; affected devices should be updated and all local passwords should be changed afterwards.
The vulnerability was acknowledged and fixed by barox Kommunikation GmbH within 10 weeks. We want to thank barox for their exemplary reaction to the vulnerability report.
CVSS Score
8.2 (CVSS v4)
CVSS Vector String
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N
Affected Version
< 6.54.3960 for RY-LGSP23-10G; < 1.03.1740 for RY-GSP22-26/370
Fixed Version
6.54.3960 for RY-LGSP23-10G; 1.03.1740 for RY-GSP22-26/370
Credits
Leon Schmidt
Vendor was contacted and informed about the vulnerability via email.
Initial response received from vendor. They started investigating the problem.
Vendor acknowledged the vulnerability and proposed CVSS score adjustments.
Vendor confirms initiation of remediation activities.
Vendor informed us that the issue was resolved and sent us the fixed firmware packages.
Vendor asks for assistance regarding CVE submission.
Vendor publishes their own advisory for the vulnerabilities.
CVE submission via the cirosec CNA.